

From: [Washoe311](#)
To: [Washoe311](#)
Subject: A new Service Request has been created [Request ID #138062] (Audit Committee) - Washoe County, NV
Date: Thursday, June 8, 2023 2:39:22 PM

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Washoe County, NV

A new service request has been filed.

Service Request Details	
ID	138062
Date/Time	6/8/2023 2:39 PM
Type	Audit Committee
Address	[REDACTED]
Origin	Control Panel
Comments	The voters of Washoe County NV need accountability in their system of voting. "WE THE PEOPLE" demand fair voting in our elections and truth with accountability from ALL INVOLVED. Without trust you have nothing but questions and disgruntled voters whom you serve.
Submitter	Wieboldt, Maro L [REDACTED] wieboldtthook4@aol.com

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Washoe County, NV

From: [Washoe311](#)
To: [Washoe311](#)
Subject: A new Service Request has been created [Request ID #138063] (Audit Committee) - Washoe County, NV
Date: Thursday, June 8, 2023 2:40:19 PM

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Washoe County, NV

A new service request has been filed.

Service Request Details	
ID	138063
Date/Time	6/8/2023 2:40 PM
Type	Audit Committee
Address	Area - Washoe County
Origin	Control Panel
Comments	We are totally against hiring The Elections Group for the county election committee. You can get better consultants that are more qualified with election integrity.
Submitter	Covert, Judy Washoe County, NV thecoverts@charter.net

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Washoe County, NV

From: [Washoe311](#)
To: [Washoe311](#)
Subject: A new Service Request has been created [Request ID #138064] (Audit Committee) - Washoe County, NV
Date: Thursday, June 8, 2023 2:41:32 PM

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Washoe County, NV

A new service request has been filed.

Service Request Details

ID	138064
Date/Time	6/8/2023 2:41 PM
Type	Audit Committee
Address	Area - Washoe County
Origin	Control Panel
Comments	Strongly oppose Risk-Limiting Audits (RLAs). Thank you.
Submitter	Gerscovich, Eugene Washoe County, NV latent2@yahoo.com

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Washoe County, NV

From: [Washoe311](#)
To: [Washoe311](#)
Subject: A new Service Request has been created [Request ID #138066] (Audit Committee) - Washoe County, NV
Date: Thursday, June 8, 2023 2:42:42 PM

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Washoe County, NV

A new service request has been filed.

Service Request Details

ID 138066

Date/Time 6/8/2023 2:42 PM

Type Audit Committee

Address Area - Washoe County

Origin Control Panel

Comments Ladies and Gentlemen:

If I didn't have my three grandkids on Friday, I would be there to speak against "The Election Integrity Group"! Speaking of grandkids, I am absolutely fearful of their future as we are at a crossroads for their freedoms and opportunities. Without restoring fair, honest, secure and transparent elections in Washoe County, Nevada and our "Representative Republic" we will self-destruct from within. Our American Exceptionalism will be lost to our future generations!

As noted in March Meeting;
Centralizing our Elections – PLEASE NO!

Harder to scale: Centralized models are more common in smaller entities; as an entity grows, it becomes more difficult for one leader to manage all operations effectively. We have 17 different counties with the state of Nevada – they are all

not the same. Don't Clark County our Washoe County!!!!

Less stakeholder involvement: Since stakeholders have limited decision-making capabilities in a centralized entity, there's less opportunity for stakeholder feedback, ideas, or initiatives to affect operations. Aren't the constituents closest to the heart of the problems?

More strain on top management: Since top-level management is responsible for all decisions in a centralized organization, the entities model can significantly strain these few key leaders. Doesn't the Secretary of State already have enough to do? They can't seem to handle the issues now!!!

How do we fix this mess? The first step is to stop going to the State or Federal government to fix problems that are actually caused by those government itself (most are!). Doing so is not just an absurd idea, it has led us to the place we are in today.

Moving forward to the principle behind the Bill of Rights (decentralization of power) will bring you a huge step closer to liberty and our Representative Republic. It's an idea whose time has come.

Why is there a push for centralization. The answer is POWER, pure and simple!!!!

Submitter Foster, Bruce
Washoe County, NV
grtdad53@sbcglobal.net

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From: [Washoe311](#)
To: [Washoe311](#)
Subject: A new Service Request has been created [Request ID #138067] (Audit Committee) - Washoe County, NV
Date: Thursday, June 8, 2023 2:43:30 PM

[**NOTICE:** This message originated outside of Washoe County -- **DO NOT CLICK** on **links** or open **attachments** unless you are sure the content is safe.]

Washoe County, NV

A new service request has been filed.

Service Request Details

ID 138067

Date/Time 6/8/2023 2:43 PM

Type Audit Committee

Address Area - Washoe County

Origin Control Panel

Comments I am unable to attend the meeting due to work schedule, but want to voice my objection to the hiring of TEG at 10:00 meeting on June 8.

If you look at TEG, its founders, and their associations with far-left organizations promoting RLAs as the solution to ensure free and fair elections, it is undeniably false. The designer of RLAs resigned his position due to the improper utilization of RLAs with faulty results due to utilization of faulty data for desired outcomes. Voters have no trust in our election system in Nevada and this only adds to our suspicions given the committee even considering hiring this company.

They can sample whatever they want, say whatever they want, and hope you're too scared or ignorant to challenge their pseudo-science. Don't buy the deception, don't buy into TEG. County Commissioners you must send these people back to where they came from and give us fair elections. It's simple: we vote in our precincts, we count in our precincts, we report in our precincts, and guess what? It's legal under AB321. Even with our flawed election system, it will save tens of millions and be thousands of

times more trustworthy.

Thank you,

Submitter McMahon, Elaina
Washoe County, NV
mcmahon_be@msn.com

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Washoe County, NV

From: Washoe311
To: Yasoben, Abigail; Martensen, Louis J.; Kleidosty, Katelyn R.
Cc: Levenhagen, Nancy; Brown, Eric P.
Subject: Fw: Public Comment Audit Committee Meeting-Item 4
Date: Friday, June 9, 2023 8:27:17 AM
Attachments: Outlook-hvhxwqj.png
Outlook-n3d5adoa.png
Outlook-xbe4medn.png
Outlook-xuc3w1e.png
Outlook-qlb01zs.png

Good morning,

Here's another public comment received.

Sincerely,



Washoe311 Service Center
Communications Division | Office of the County Manager
washoe311@washoecounty.gov | Office: 3-1-1 | 775.328.2003 | Fax: 775.328.2491
1001 E. Ninth St., Bldg A, Reno, NV 89512

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From: janicemh <janicemh@protonmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, June 8, 2023 3:22 PM
To: Washoe311 <Washoe311@washoecounty.gov>
Cc: janicemh@protonmail.com <janicemh@protonmail.com>
Subject: Re: Public Comment Audit Committee Meeting-Item 4

[NOTICE: This message originated outside of Washoe County -- DO NOT CLICK on links or open attachments unless you are sure the content is safe.]

Please put my comments on the permanent record. I am a Washoe County, Nevada Taxpayer and protest the frivolous spending on the Elections Group report and any further spending must be prohibited.

A portion of the following comment I am submitting echoes what I said via email at the April 11 meeting of the commissioner's when they put this item back on the agenda after it had been rejected due to a tie vote.

This is a group (The Elections Group) that is newly formed, hastily gathering information in a brief period of time when Nevada residents have been working at this for a minimum of 2-1/2 years and many who have spent multiple years working on elections in our county.

There should be NO MORE money spent on this endeavor from a group that has no investment in this community. These are people who have left other jobs early for "semiretirement", it appears on our dime, some of whom have been rejected in other states and counties. Why does Washoe County want to spend so much money when we have found the answers here in our own community?

The report even states that the Registrar of Voters is "burdened with the minutiae of daily operations due to understaffing". What they fail to mention is that the understaffing is a result of the fact that the staff QUIT! Why? I think that question needs to be answered.

As a taxpayer for Washoe County, I insist that you vote no to any additional funds being spent on the Elections Group and a full investigation should be done to determine why the staff left. If it is a result of leadership, or lack thereof, leadership needs to change. Spending money does not solve the problems of poor leadership.

Janice Hermesen, BSBM, MSML

Sent with [Proton Mail](#) secure email.

From: [Nancy Davis](#)
To: [Washoe311](#)
Subject: Regarding The Election Group (TEG) Services Being Used By Washoe County
Date: Thursday, June 8, 2023 1:19:05 PM
Attachments: [999C8C376004422190351D246CF8C59D.png](#)
[A8C24C7DE95F470B86AD03075C82F73F.png](#)
[5A5ACEBB3B6E4456923842317F357068.png](#)

[**NOTICE:** This message originated outside of Washoe County -- **DO NOT CLICK** on **links** or open **attachments** unless you are sure the content is safe.]

The citizens of Washoe County DO NOT need or want the services of The Election Group (TEG). We have enough graft and corruption in our county. I work for a living so I cannot be at your meeting. See below for explanation...

So, as we've previously covered [Eric Brownstain's lies](#) about the Election Group and the controversy surrounding TEG (aka the Elections Group), we feel it's important to share with you the controversy not just surrounding TEG and its officers but also the primary audit function they promote: Risk-Limiting Audits (RLAs).

To get the background information on TEG, start here:

<https://www.influencewatch.org/for-profit/the-elections-group>

<https://operationsunlight.com/2023/04/17/eric-brown-liar-or-loon>

www.safeelections.org

<https://democracyfund.org/idea/increasing-trust-in-elections-democracy-funds-election-validation-project>

<https://democracyfund.org/idea/knowning-its-right-limiting-the-risk-of-certifying-elections/>

Okay, let's get rolling into this. You may have heard of the prestigious Philip Stark; he is truly a smart and accomplished individual with numerous accolades that would require a full post to cover. [You can find some of his achievements here.](#)

What you may not know is that he is one of the pioneers behind Risk-Limiting Audits (RLAs). Jennifer Morrell, one of the founders of TEG, uses RLAs as one of her preferred methods to demonstrate the fairness and integrity of elections. However, one only needs to examine the instances where RLAs have been used, such as in Colorado (Tina Peters), Fulton County, Georgia (Herschel Walker), and Pennsylvania (Doug Mastriano), to quickly challenge the notion of fairness and justice. Now, stay with me, as this story concludes with a bang.

Critics of RLAs typically present the following arguments:

- They are too complex and expensive. They are not necessary to ensure the accuracy of elections.
- They can be manipulated by partisan actors. RLAs can be used to find fraud or errors that do not exist, if the auditors are biased or have a vested interest in the outcome of the election.
- RLAs only focus on auditing a small portion of the total ballots cast, which may not provide sufficient assurance of the overall accuracy of the election results. A larger sample size or a full recount would be more effective in detecting

potential errors or fraud.

- RLAs can be complex to implement and may require significant resources, including time, money, and technical expertise. Costs associated with conducting RLAs might outweigh their perceived benefits and offer no real value in trustworthy findings anyway.
- RLAs rely on statistical methods and assumptions to determine the appropriate sample size and level of risk. These assumptions may introduce biases or uncertainties into the audit process, potentially leading to inaccurate or misleading results.
- Vulnerabilities to Manipulation, RLAs can be vulnerable to manipulation or strategic behavior by election officials or other actors. The selection of the audit sample or other aspects of the RLA process could be manipulated to favor specific outcomes.
- Lack of standardized guidelines or procedures for conducting RLAs. Without consistent protocols, there can be variations in how RLAs are implemented across different jurisdictions, leading to inconsistent levels of confidence in election results.
- Reliance on Paper Ballots: RLAs often rely on the availability of paper ballots as a reference for comparison. In jurisdictions where electronic voting systems are prevalent, the absence of a reliable paper trail undermines the effectiveness of RLAs.
- Human Error and Manipulation: RLAs can still be susceptible to human error or manipulation. If mistakes or fraudulent activities occur during the initial ballot counting process, RLAs may not be able to detect or address them adequately.
- Time Constraints: Conducting RLAs require a significant amount of time, especially for larger elections. The extended timeframe may delay the certification of election results, potentially leading to uncertainties and public mistrust.
- Public Perception and Confidence: There are major concerns about the impact of RLAs on public perception and confidence in the electoral process. They argue that even if RLAs are statistically sound, the mere existence of audits may create doubts and skepticism among the public about the legitimacy of election outcomes.

Lack of Accessibility: Critics raise concerns about the accessibility of RLAs, particularly for individuals with disabilities or language barriers. They argue that the technical complexities involved in conducting RLAs may limit the ability of all voters to fully understand and participate in the audit process.

- Resource Intensiveness: Critics argue that RLAs can be resource-intensive, requiring significant time, manpower, and financial investment. This can pose challenges for jurisdictions with limited resources or tight election timelines.
- Subjectivity in Risk Thresholds: RLAs involve setting a risk threshold, which determines the acceptable level of risk for an audit to confirm the accuracy of the election outcome. Critics argue that these thresholds can be subjective and vary between jurisdictions, potentially leading to inconsistent standards for determining audit outcomes.
- Complexity for Public Understanding: Some critics assert that RLAs can be complex for the general public to comprehend. The statistical methodologies and technical aspects involved may make it difficult for individuals without specialized knowledge to understand and trust the audit process.
- Timing and Certification Constraints: Conducting RLAs within strict timeframes can pose challenges for jurisdictions aiming to certify election results promptly. Critics argue that the time-consuming nature of RLAs can potentially delay the certification process, creating uncertainties and logistical hurdles.
- Political Polarization: RLAs have not been immune to the polarized political climate surrounding elections. Critics argue that partisan interests and biases can influence the perception and acceptance of RLAs, leading to skepticism or resistance in implementing these audit methods.
- **Officials can potentially manipulate the process by keeping a set of pre-determined correct ballots aside and using them during the RLA, giving the illusion of an audit without conducting a genuine examination. This can create a scenario of “election theater” where the appearance of an audit is presented, but no actual comprehensive audit takes place.**

Furthermore, the pioneer behind RLAs, Philip Stark, reportedly resigned from Verified Voting due to concerns about RLAs and the questionable practices associated with them.

You can read his resignation letter [here](#):

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In summary, he says:

- Philip believes that VV is providing cover for untrustworthy voting systems by conducting “risk-limiting audits” (RLAs) of untrustworthy paper records.
- Philip argues that this contradicts the principle of Evidence-Based Elections, which requires establishing that the paper trail is trustworthy.
- Philip is concerned that VV is promoting RLAs at the expense of a more fundamental requirement for trustworthy elections: a trustworthy paper trail.
- Philip is particularly concerned about VV’s claims that RLAs in Georgia and Philadelphia confirm election outcomes, which he believes are false and misleading.
- Philip argues that VV should be demanding evidence that the paper trail is trustworthy, rather than providing cover for bad actors.

Now, if you look at TEG, its founders, and their associations with far-left organizations promoting RLAs as the solution to ensure free and fair elections, call BS. It’s all BS. They can sample whatever they want, say whatever they want, and hope you’re too scared or ignorant to challenge their pseudo-science.

Don’t take it from me, take it from the pioneer Philip Stark himself:

“With sadness and disappointment, I am resigning from the board of [Verified Voting](#). I believe that Verified Voting has lost its way. It has been providing cover for inherently untrustworthy voting systems—and the officials who bought them, the companies that make them, and any officials who might contemplate buying them in the future—by conducting “risk-limiting audits” of untrustworthy paper records, creating the false and misleading impression that relying on untrustworthy paper for a RLA can confirm election outcomes (and debasing the meaning of “RLA” in the process).”

Thank you!

Nancy Davis

